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      NT的密碼究竟放在哪

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      發(fā)表于 2011-1-12 21:01:17 | 只看該作者 |倒序瀏覽 |閱讀模式
      根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100% p7 Z5 o" L1 w/ h4 S! }& A" f! D

      " e/ T7 B6 a$ hFrom: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
      4 B9 S. ^6 l( M9 W1 H7 q& }! C! g
      ' T$ s9 r4 k% S7 GTo: sans@clark.net; m5 D6 K+ e- k* d" h/ _
      Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
      * D5 c  L1 Z' i; Y. {$ M# GHi all,
      ; ^+ J* ?1 b1 |7 r' J4 vWe knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across( n3 V* `, o; t; v
      the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
        z" T  U* I9 r: y! c5 V$ C# M& FIIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can2 s" T; {, \9 e$ z% S& V7 }6 z
      be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,- j, F) d8 s; A) ^# l1 v: c
      Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
      ' p  p5 s: [6 _$ wC:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin9 D9 R. q) i5 W9 B# S$ m
      The IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
      ) Z4 @, n3 L/ Q9 y& t- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the7 y" _& s, |# |! Q/ Y
      MMC)
        x, n2 e" g8 @4 M- a+ p2 x- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)9 W. _$ s% h5 p
      - UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of4 R/ f- l4 R; {! e
      your virtual directories is located there.5 c, a* q: F8 E8 L0 n' j/ I
      - The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called+ c/ o% v+ z8 S5 P3 ]7 ^- E
      "HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).. i# h* ?& ]9 _  e+ }9 S! _( A
      Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are5 [1 r. ^3 @0 m$ w
      srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
      ( d& s: ?: l& `* J7 |  ^7 V4 c& q# Nhave permissions on this file.
      ( Y4 @) E/ \2 `' WBUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
      6 \: z6 `0 o/ v& Q4 ^  gthese passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
      : P  V% T' u# o5 AThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a
      ; B( D5 P- i  umalicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.
      : i" H. x) ~+ Y  o* qObviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow
        Z+ a9 L0 }1 L1 k7 s& `logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
      8 M$ E7 u# ^4 p  [problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
      ! y" D  e8 w3 G4 z"$ d, |7 C+ N# m0 x3 D$ q
      IIS 4.0 Metabase/ ?9 t: L: J5 D$ l# @& ^. w
      ?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
      9 k4 e1 M& \- n! y. ?& `- }4 Y' `--- UNC User ---# e: E4 q: n$ i) [' D, i& r
      UNC User name: 'Lou'
      - E0 W8 o* ^" lUNC User password: 'Microsoft'% M  P8 V# Y7 D; S; s
      UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
      7 b7 a5 r8 U# ^/ D& G/ @--- Anonymous User ---
      & _# w1 ~5 l! B5 {Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
      - ]8 s0 x' c: J# ]: hAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
      7 W- ?. g9 C# f/ ZPassword synchronization: 'False'7 S$ z" z9 H4 {. e$ k
      --- IIS Logs DSN User ---
      6 g3 R! U! X, Y) Q* x1 ^1 eODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'$ y1 l0 p$ y) `# p* z
      ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'# V3 t) s7 o  n( M% F0 q
      ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
      $ w! K; y4 L& P2 X9 W/ Y! r4 R- oODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
      ) O, C, n3 S& ^% _+ ~4 o--- Web Applications User ---: a4 g2 Q7 I1 W0 [% p! a- y
      WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
      * J# A/ {4 R: ]$ k. M: y# TWAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
      + I5 L- w1 U: T  ?' `* iDefault Logon Domain: ''
      & E4 D' d/ q7 h* e1 b"( G5 v7 m5 a8 g1 x" h
      For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
      $ }5 G9 j5 q; p/ ^A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
      ; H8 a3 T' {2 Gserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
      & f8 C) L" O( y; van IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts6 ~" @9 p  b  t. H3 C% h. z( F
      the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual/ e( P8 v* x5 l
      directory located on another server, say (b).
      6 Q6 `9 U3 {. W9 i  z5 O3 B' FNow, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).7 q% p8 H# m$ O% _2 L3 w  P1 }
      And so forth...
      6 [  Q0 h& v  ZMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.
      . B( W0 M( C" d* b4 d( l7 C0 u& n_______________________________________________________________________
      7 \3 [6 B" L9 A% U/ m% tPatrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
      0 T( X, e+ h& W/ [0 jMCP NT 4.0
      9 ^: q, {  b2 |7 i0 L) QInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions) S% s+ Y4 G" U; m
      e-business Services5 e" q/ m- o3 t3 m6 s
      IBM Global Services' |7 ~* I% ?* Z$ ~6 D4 M9 L- @+ a
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