標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪 [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: 雜七雜八 時(shí)間: 2011-1-12 21:01 標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪 根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡(jiǎn)單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100 0 _, \. r) U! x( |8 v" `8 K# _1 C# E: x9 t3 ~
From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr> . ^ N) Y7 f+ @5 e4 C5 [ # h; v9 m* ]" |- {0 B- c1 c' UTo: sans@clark.net 8 [+ K& N6 F8 f" q! d) JSubject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords1 Z1 L" c, w- e5 y/ s# h0 c& p
Hi all, 5 h7 i3 _! w; w4 ]3 aWe knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across6 \; }+ S! L, a# i" h% X1 W
the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.% F' H7 Y9 G* h' ^
IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can * x( e! K1 f+ g: D+ p" z5 s5 Obe compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,( K* \! ^4 M# v4 a% v
Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:2 c6 R! Z6 x2 ~: h' p
C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin : ]4 Q1 P/ w, d) c/ i% M9 ~" HThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords: # F% l0 K- } d% y9 Q- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the& Q0 Q9 { s2 u0 p- ?6 d+ v9 D2 F
MMC)5 Z, C! V4 c8 W- W" A
- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !) 6 x, v" u# O6 |# t3 O7 z+ l- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of / i2 G) _6 `& n/ [' Dyour virtual directories is located there.9 y2 B/ j( Y. z' U7 p' \
- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called" H; x4 V' ^% p, l( F
"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database)." h5 d& p- v! i4 e6 }. i
Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are+ ~5 S0 ~- Y: y5 Q
srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM5 \( H6 k5 J. {/ T# {$ ~
have permissions on this file. " J) i9 z0 P D' V7 l8 DBUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print " U6 q# o( }1 m% u% F7 K2 s! [these passwords in CLEAR TEXT. ) G7 O. l$ z9 P% C# }% v1 B% Q- U" CThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a 4 U. {/ i6 v1 E( Y& j/ k% u( Umalicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.) n4 n+ h( z- r4 w
Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow: z/ S; I+ }7 n* ?! ]- ]* e
logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the % p) ^% t: R3 u: y7 E3 ~7 O% F5 ^' fproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered: ( }5 u% ^/ z$ I: Z- v, r2 u( }"9 z" p% Q+ a, q* k) \; m, Q3 R
IIS 4.0 Metabase / Z: v2 S% n' r+ K+ k?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr / o. B1 A! n# ^1 A2 o7 g" X+ m5 J--- UNC User --- / `( {: F6 o" i) C8 ~5 ^: vUNC User name: 'Lou'1 ~( S7 P% T2 G9 R% |! r0 ?; G; r
UNC User password: 'Microsoft'5 x$ ] ?; p" y0 k; v, ?
UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False' 0 B4 p4 [' I8 e5 _4 x3 }--- Anonymous User --- + f% b# R+ G9 v0 aAnonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'' k) H$ n* G% e, D
Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'4 S0 A7 H% R6 {! Z9 h
Password synchronization: 'False' 9 \7 J1 C2 W1 m* F4 e2 _& X--- IIS Logs DSN User ---$ Y1 O( R! `. ?: V; I5 i6 W
ODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG' 6 g. f; D7 E" i( zODBC table name: 'InternetLog' 8 h6 j" I! g# E, ^ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin': } g* S6 h/ X0 Z; N
ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx' ( q; _' \; K `* c2 T8 G8 f" Z--- Web Applications User --- , u @4 {4 Z5 }: V! H* x$ y. x" [WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'' s' H7 x% T( ~& K
WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'6 E3 w q& g: P$ }9 ]: X x
Default Logon Domain: '' ! d" ~* t8 F$ B5 u& l! B; M"6 N0 o, [7 s5 a6 O E; i4 r( N7 O- A
For example, you can imagine the following scenario: . X% ~& O3 R+ k1 o5 I' M5 S ^A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say* G* {/ A7 O) o( C4 u
server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example 9 q) U, F. [) t9 ran IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts/ D$ G* R2 K3 ?; ]9 y$ H. t; M
the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual3 c4 ~+ T8 z7 f# b+ G
directory located on another server, say (b).6 y- v$ Y# V) [
Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b). 3 L, O- D7 j- K8 d. _6 q" C1 CAnd so forth... 6 P5 m: \/ O& X2 q2 |5 e! b5 EMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.9 u2 m- L% H& |3 f: p# G6 I! Z7 P
_______________________________________________________________________3 D! \! ?" b7 v/ B
Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr 1 f% ^ W/ u' u9 N5 c% p" d5 _MCP NT 4.0 4 j4 J. h3 c) U& E; p5 {$ J8 k) q) pInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions: [7 {/ e- Z' k( E) k2 H' m
e-business Services# m! m1 v+ V( l5 ]! W( Y$ }' V
IBM Global Services 8 m6 S; I9 I- o